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history of material life. Those who can emulate Dr. Multhauf's example may realize 
an opportunity to bring their specialty into a mainstream of modern historiographi- 
cal concern. 
As to the physical aspects of Neptune's Gift, it should be said that it maintains the 
very high standards of design established in the Johns Hopkins Studies in the History 
of Technology. The text is munificently illustrated and fairly bristles with substantial 
tables and  charts, the most pleasing feature of which is their juxtaposition  on,  or 
adjacent to, the appropriate page of text. Unfortunately the technology of production 
does not quite match the skill of design: the text is printed on a high-gloss paper that 
makes reading a sore strain in artificial light. 
Finally a  postscript would  seem appropriate at this time and in this place. For 
fifteen years Dr. Multhauf labored as editor of Isis to improve the style and substance 
of the output of historians of science. We now know how he brought savor to his task 
and at the same time did not fall victim to credulity. On all scores we owe him our 
congratulations  and our gratitude. 
OWEN  HANNAWAY 
Department  of  History of Science 
Johns  Hopkins  University 
Baltimore, Maryland 21218 
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Barry Barnes; Steven Shapin (Editors). Natural Order: Historical Studies of Scien- 
tific Culture. 255 pp. Beverly Hills/ London: Sage Publications, 1979. $17.50 (cloth); 
$8.95 (paper). 
For at least a generation, would-be innovators in the history of science have railed 
against  the  distinction  between so-called  internal and external approaches to  the 
scientific enterprise. At the same time a growing minority of practitioners have dealt 
with context and social location in explaining particular scientific developments. The 
present collective work constitutes a particularly forceful contribution to this contin- 
uing tradition. 
The editors argue that scientific concepts, like man's other cultural products, are 
fully understandable only in their "context of use." This context can reflect religious 
or  regional  identity,  the  needs  of  a  particular class  grouping,  or  a  generational 
difference in perception; it can reflect as well the diversity of training, institutional 
affiliation, and  aspiration  within modern scientific disciplines.  Scientific ideas are 
thus metaphor and tool, not simply ever closer simulations of a natural reality. For if 
there is a particular other against which the editors and contributors define them- 
selves, it is those historians and philosophers of science who treat scientific ideas as 
"Platonic essences, by virtue of which their purity is guaranteed against the effects of 
any mere contingency" (p. 132). It is the very boundary between the realms of logic 
and  contingency  which they  hope  to  eradicate, substituting for it an  interface in 
which social, cultural, and institutional factors interact to shape particular scientific 
ideas. "The use of cultural resources to construct scientific theories is an observation 
of what happens," as they put it, "not the casting of an aspersion" (p.  138). 
The editors' title is precisely appropriate. Natural Order  implies man's need both to 
create a predictable order in his particular world and to see that order as legitimate 
inasmuch as  it  mirrors relationships that are intrinsic, inexorable, and thus tran- 
scendent.  More  immediately,  the  title  invokes  the  academic  program  of  Mary 
Douglas  by echoing the title of her much-quoted Natural Symbols.  For the editors 292  CHARLES  E. ROSENBERG 
find in her work a powerful assertion both of the cultural significance of symbolic 
structures and  of  the  necessity  of  seeing  such  world-ordering  conceptions  in  a 
"context of use," as growing out of specific social realities. By invoking the anthro- 
pologist's  relativist  perspective,  moreover,  they  subvert  the  vision  of  science  as 
culture-free cognitive  system.  It is to  see the ideas of eighteenth- and nineteenth- 
century science as  part of  a continuum  that includes Semitic nomads, Trobriand 
Islanders, Azande medicine men, and Bog Irishmen in London. Barnes and Shapin 
have shrewdly endorsed a position which has both polemical strength and a practical 
efficacy in justifying a flexible range of research options. 
Almost any aspect of culture or of a scientific discipline is-in  Barnes'  and Shapin's 
formulation-a  potential  factor in shaping cognitive forms. The general point, as 
Donald  MacKenzie and Barry Barnes put it, "is not that the goal-oriented character 
of  scientific judgment  implies its relationship to any particular contingency,  or to 
external factors,  or political interests; what is implied is that any such contingency 
.may have a bearing on judgment and that contingent sociological factors must have. 
What these factors are is always a matter for concrete empirical investigation" (p. 
205).  This is a position  so  tentative and eclectic that it almost  approximates  the 
theory-starved practice of a good  many historians. 
Further, if one ignores the last few essays, which deal with the twentieth century- 
about these more later-the  book can be seen as having a specific historical subject as 
well  as  a  programmatic  thrust.  This  is  the  shift  in  worldview  of  educated  and 
articulate Britons between the mid-eighteenth and early twentieth centuries, espe- 
cially the way in which concepts about the natural world served in various ways as an 
adaptive mechanism, allowing  particular groups and individuals to  legitimate new 
roles and new ambitions in comforting worlds of metaphor. This book might well 
have been subtitled: Science, Social Change, and Worldview in Modernizing Britain. 
For almost every essay in the first three-quarters of the book  turns on the way in 
which particular groups coped with new social situations through the manipulation 
of  words and symbols.  Christopher Lawrence, for example,  sees the creation of a 
particular metaphorical view of the body emerging from changing social hierarchies 
in eighteenth-century Scotland, mirroring the "social interests and self-perceptions of 
the  improving  landed  class."  Shapin  views  the  particular form  and  content  of 
phrenology as associated with the values and perceptions of a predominately urban 
middle class.  In an even  more expansive  formulation,  Roger  Cooter  pictures the 
didactic  popular  physiology  of  nineteenth-century England as  having "facilitated 
people's  entry  into  and  rationalization  of  the bourgeoise  social  hegemony." Roy 
Porter's study of "Creation and Credence: The Career of Theories of the Earth in 
Britain, 1660-1820," traces in more cautious fashion the decline of those hierarchy- 
embodying cosmologies which flourished in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth 
centuries. Mathematics represents a particularly "hard  case" for advocates of contex- 
tual approaches to the history of science, and in an ingenious essay Joan Richards 
argues  that  the  tardiness  of  English  mathematicians in  accepting  non-Euclidean 
geometry  had  much  to  do  with  the  epistemological-and  thus  social-status  of 
geometry in nineteenth-century England. Geometry served as a key argument for the 
existence  of absolute truth attainable through other than empirical means-"from 
truth which could be gained through mere deduction from a series of experiments" 
(p. 148). Richards's case study is neatly supplemented by Brian Wynne's examination 
of parallels between an interest in psychic phenomena on the part of certain English 
physicists and their technical position in regard to the role of ether in physical theory. 
All of the essays in the early part of the book relate to the way in which cultural 
factors  shape scientific ideas  or to  the way  scientific ideas can serve as modes  of 
visualizing and thus controlling society for at least some of its members. There is a 
nagging asymmetry, however, in the balance of case studies provided. Despite the NATURE  DECODED  293 
editors' programmatic emphasis on the need to see sociological  factors within the 
modern  scientific  disciplines  as  appropriate  variables,  only  a  few  of  the  essays 
illustrate this approach. And this is unfortunate polemically as well as intellectually. 
For few historians in the 1970s would doubt or question the way in which scientific 
formulations served to rationalize and mediate social relationships, even define social 
identities in the cultural and economic transformations of the nineteenth century. It is 
another-and  perhaps more intractable-problem  to demonstrate the way in which 
contingent circumstances within the modern scientific disciplines, questions of train- 
ing, of recruitment, of institutional affiliation and ambition, determine the particular 
shape of the knowledge produced by that discipline. 
Only two  of  the essays address themselves explicitly to such questions.  Donald 
MacKenzie's and Barry Barnes's elegant study of the Mendelian-biometrician con- 
troversy  suggests  that  an  impressive  range of  factors  shaped  the  conflict,  some 
internal to the world of academic biology and others relevant to the protagonists in 
their role as members of a particular class at a particular moment in time. In an essay 
on the continuing controversy between biosystematists and more traditional descrip- 
tive  taxonomists,  John  Dean  provides  an even more sharply defined instance in 
which factors internal to the social anatomy of the relevant disciplines explain how 
two very different orientations toward an appropriate basis for botanical taxonomy 
have co-existed  for decades. 
Thus  far all  well,  and  in  general good.  Yet this collection  illustrates as many 
problems as it provides solutions.  One lies in the reductionist functionalism  that 
characterizes many of the essays. A problem is posed, an interest suggested, the veils 
of ideological  obfuscation  pulled back, and a more fundamental truth emerges. In 
treating science as ideology,  that is, the contributors tend to  reduce ideas to their 
functional utility to particular groups. It must be obvious, moreover, and it is to most 
of the authors when they are not betrayed by their own rhetoric, that a function is not 
the function and that function is not meaning, certainly not to the individuals who 
believed and articulated the ideas under discussion.  Yet the denouement  of these 
essays tends to  assume a rather more one-dimensional form. Let me cite a passage 
from Brian Wynne's contribution: "There is a striking analogy between the ineffable, 
unseen  ethereal basis  of  matter and  the articulation of  an ineffable spiritual and 
transcendent basis of social reality-the  conservative ideological response to bour- 
geoise individualism" (p. 180). I do not mean to single this essay out; parallel passages 
could be culled from at least half of the chapters. Such facile connection between 
social location  and the form of a particular idea removes the historical actor from 
that very richness of context  in which Barnes and Shapin would have him placed. 
I use the term facile with care and some regret. Although I admire these essays, the 
book is too  often dotted with just such facile imputations. It is marked as well by a 
kind of paradoxical idealism.  Despite a good  many references to contexts and the 
multiplicity of factors within and without the academic disciplines, the contributors 
almost  never place their protagonists  in an appropriately detailed social location. 
References to landed elements or upwardly mobile bourgeois groups are simply too 
imprecise. As Shapin himself so eloquently argues, it is no longer meaningful simply 
to assert that scientific knowledge can be referred to social factors. "The task is the 
refinement and clarification of the ways in which scientific knowledge is to be referred 
to the various contextual factors and interests which produce it" (p. 42). If this is the 
case-as  common  sense tells  us it must be-then  historians of natural knowledge 
must  be particularly careful to  define precisely the intellectual communities to  be 
studied and their social and institutional affiliations. Despite the invocation of Mary 
Douglas, the figure most immanent in these essays is Arthur 0.  Lovejoy-for  it is the 
tools  of  the  historian  of  ideas,  not  those  of  the  sociologist,  social  historian,  or 
symbolic anthropologist,  which the authors find most comfortable in hand. 294  CHARLES  E. ROSENBERG 
There is another and even more elusive problem in addressing the social factors 
which shape intellectual products, and that is specifying the meaning of their partici- 
pation  to  the  actors.  A  number of  possible  views  on  what  that  meaning  is  are 
represented in  Natural Order. Cooter sees popular physiology as an opiate of the 
masses, playing a hegemonic role in creating a disabling false consciousness among 
potential  working-class  leaders.  He  imputes,  I  am  afraid,  rather more  power to 
scientific  ideas  than  many,  including  this  reviewer, would  grant them.  Cooter's 
interpretation implies, moreover, almost insuperable problems of evidence. A softer 
position would limit interpretation to the benefits accruing to the individuals actually 
articulating such ideas,  in most  of  the cases suggested here small groups  of  self- 
conscious  intellectuals. A few nineteenth-century Englishmen were attracted by the 
role of scholar and made the articulation of scientific ideas central to their sense of 
social  identity.  Exercises in self-assurance, however, should  not be confused with 
objectively effective weapons in the working out of class antagonisms, even though 
these functions  may in some ways overlap. 
Such problems are clear enough to the editors. Their mode of dealing with them is 
to endorse an elegant and defensible eclecticism which assumes multiple causation 
and levels of meaning. Their method assimilates history of science to contemporary 
history more than to anthropology or sociology. But to demystify science and move it 
from sacred to secular time substitutes a different kind of dilemma for the internalist's 
world of autonomous  cognitive events: the historian's seamless web, an interpretive 
wilderness in which everything is potentially relevant to everything else. 
By way of conclusion,  let me suggest that this book might itself be understood as 
an object of the same sort of analysis it prescribes for other cultural artifacts. Like the 
case-studies in the social origins of esoteric knowledge it provides, this book can at 
some level be understood only in its relationship both to society generally and to the 
esoteric knowledge community to which it is specifically addressed. Thus the book is 
characterized by the anti-authoritarianism so widespread in recent political attitudes. 
To deny the transcendence of scientific knowledge is, after all, a political act. The 
contextual  approach to  science is a social tool  as well as an epistemology,  taking 
knowledge which had seemed eternal, disinterested, inevitable and arguing that it was 
provisional, interested, a result not of the iron logic of eternal ideas, but of particular 
mundane interests. In the past generation we have seen parallel arguments used to 
undermine the social claims of scientific knowledge and its bearers in debates over 
issues  as  diverse  as  medical  care  and  institutionalization,  the  place  of  women, 
government policies in regard to energy, environment, and war. 
Within the discipline of history of science, of course, an aggressive contextualism 
must necessarily appear in opposition  to a once-dominant internalism (despite the 
editors' unwillingness to accept the legitimacy of that distinction). The contributors 
are careful to define their intellectual identity, moreover, by avoiding a number of 
contemporary approaches potentially relevant to their concerns. If they dismiss the 
mandarinism of science as culture-free cognitive system, they are equally firm-if  less 
explicit-in  their rejection of the formal externalism of a Merton or Ben-David. The 
contents of ideas are of fundamental importance to the authors of Natural Order, yet 
at the same time revelatory of social reality-indeed  an inextricable part of that social 
reality. 
This general emphasis is hardly novel.  In the field of medical history alone  one 
could  mention  such  names as  Sigerist,  Shryock,  Rosen,  Pagel,  Ackerknecht-all 
advocates  and  practitioners of a history that placed ideas in specific contexts  and 
explained them in terms of their social uses. But none of these scholars contemplated 
quite  so  categorical an assimilation  of  science and its works to  the realm of  the 
contingent and the culturally defined. Most scholars would still concede that there is 
something  peculiar  about  the  way  in  which  ideas  function  in  modern  scientific COLLEGIUM  HISTORICUM  295 
disciplines; yet such a difference simply adds another layer of complexity to the web 
of social explanation  so forcefully argued in Natural Order. For the program which 
Barnes and Shapin outline with such enthusiasm is forbidding indeed: to recreate the 
context  of  ideas,  pinpoint  the social  place  of  knowledge producers, evaluate  the 
subtle  ways  in  which  social  perception  influences the  choice  among  intellectual 
options. The facility which occasionally mars these essays is no more than inadver- 
tent evidence of the difficulties inherent in the laudable task the essayists have under- 
taken. 
CHARLES E.  ROSENBERG 
Department of  History 
University of  Pennsylvania 
Philadelphia,  Pennsylvania 19104 
Collegium historicum 
David C. Lindberg (Editor). Science in the Middle Ages. (Chicago History of Science 
and Medicine series.) xv + 549 pp., illus., bibl., index. Chicago/London:  University of 
Chicago Press,  1978. $40. 
Among readers of this journal, at least, "medieval science" is no longer regarded as 
a  contradiction  in terms. Nevertheless the phrase still presents many problems of 
connotation and denotation that are not similarly felt with regard to Greek science or 
to modern science. A characteristic of the pioneer investigators in the subject was to 
identify in the Middle Ages attributes that were similar to those of later science. In 
this way "medieval science" was defined by similarity of connotation  with modern 
science, and could be seen as clearly preparing the way for the emergence of the latter. 
Classic examples were Pierre Duhem's assimilation of impetus theory to seventeenth- 
century mechanics and his claim that Nicole Oresme invented analytical geometry. In 
like manner writers such as John Herman Randall and Alistair C. Crombie tried to 
link the Middle Ages to modern times by means of methodological discussions, while 
Lynn  Thorndike  saw  in  the  murkier field  of  magic  a  true  breeding ground  of 
experimental  science.  Meanwhile  George Sarton's Introduction  to  the History  of 
Science  came to  a  shuddering if  splendid halt in the fourteenth century.  He had 
overcome  his earlier "scientist's" attitude to  the  Middle Ages and was now being 
overwhelmed  by the  wealth  of  material that  he saw as essential to the history of 
science.  "There was no annus mirabilis in the fourteenth century.  .  .  . It does not 
follow,  as so many ignorant persons think, that the mediaeval activities were sterile. 
That would be just as foolish as to consider a pregnant woman sterile as long as the 
fruit of her womb  was unborn" (Vol.  III, p.  15). 
With the territory being thus staked out study could proceed less apologetically, 
and an immense amount of scholarly work has appeared. One thinks particularly of 
that produced by Marshall Clagett and his academic descendants, many of whom 
contribute to the present volume. With this there are signs of changing orientations. 
If earlier investigators were largely guided by connotative similarities, it soon became 
apparent that the texts thus chosen to represent medieval science were in the Middle 
Ages often closely  linked with other texts that did not seem scientific by the same 
criteria.  But  this  closeness  suggests  a  need  to  widen  the denotation  of  the term 
"medieval science"; or perhaps, now that the Middle Ages has been established as a 
legitimate area of investigation for historians of science, to be wary of using the term 
"science"  at all. The question is not simply one of semantic quibbling or demarcation 
disputes, for if science is so inextricably entwined with philosophy and theology, we 